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Abstract 
This paper looks at the issue of border effects in the enlarged European Union. We 
have considered accession countries of different size and other characteristics, i.e. 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Cyprus. We have measured the 
extent to which internal trade exceeds international trade in a set up where controls 
for other economic determinants of commerce have been considered. In order to 
avoid inflated border effects, information at the regional level both for CEECs and 
EU countries has been used to construct a weighted measure of distance both for 
between-countries and internal distances. Furthermore, in order to separate border 
effects from impediments to trade due to technical barriers we look at the extent of 
border effects for sectors grouped according to the approach adopted by the EU to 
remove technical barriers in the EU. All distance measures have been found negative 
and significant for all types of products. The border effect coefficients for the 
harmonic mean have been found consistently smaller, regardless the relevance of 
technical barriers. Furthermore distance has also been found to be a slightly smaller 
impediment when using the effective measure. 
Checking for the presence of technical barriers to trade, our results suggest that the 
border effects are the largest for old approach products, where we expect to have 
the most important technical barrier to trade due to complicated harmonization 
procedures. The ‘other approach’ category has the smallest border effects, while the 
‘mixed approach’ products are in between the two previous categories. Our 
countries of interest would trade with themselves 221 times more in old approach 
products, while only 24 times more in other approach products. 
JEL Classification: F13, F15 
November 2003 
1. Introduction1 
This paper looks at the issue of border effects in the enlarged EU 
economic space. Evidence of border effects in the exchanges of 
CEECs countries is still an undeveloped issue in the literature. Only 
Sousa and Disdier (2002) have assessed the effect of legal framework 
on bilateral trade flows of Hungary, Romania and Slovenia with EU 
and CEFTA countries using the ‘border effects’ approach. Referring 
to the period 1995-1998 they find more significant border effects 
towards CEFTA countries than towards EU countries. In this paper 
we have considered accession countries of different size and other 
characteristics, i.e. Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Latvia 
and Cyprus. We have measured the extent to which internal trade 
exceeds international trade in a set up where controls for other 
economic determinants of commerce have been considered. 
Until now the issue of border effects has been investigated along 
different dimensions. A central point of recent discussions has been 
the definition of the geographical entities that are actually separated by 
relevant borders. First evidence in the literature concentrated on 
borders between countries (McCallum, 1995; Wei, 1996; Nitch, 2000; 
Head and Mayer, 2000). These papers show surprisingly large and time 
enduring border effects comparing intra-national and international 
exchanges of Canada, US and Europe. Starting from Wolf (1997, 
2000) border effects have been investigated also at the intra-national 
level. Referring to the US, Wolf (1997, 2000) finds intra-state trade 
excessive relative to inter-state trade, such evidence suggesting a 
degree of market fragmentation also at the national level. Similar intra-
national evidence for an EU country has been recently provided by 
                                                          
1 The authors acknowledge comments and suggestions from Paul Brenton, Keith 
Head and Robert Mayer on a previous draft to the paper. We also thank participants 
at seminars at Universitè Catholique de Louvain and at the ETSG conference in 
Madrid. The usual disclaimer applies. Errors have to be attributed only to us. 
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Head and Mayer (2003). Administrative borders in France have been 
shown to have a negative impact for trade. Examining the question 
whether nations or intra-national geographical entities, such as 
regions, express non-linearities in the propensity to exchange goods, 
other things constant, aims directly at the black box, i.e. the ‘nature’ of 
border effects. If border effects are a direct consequence of 
protection, or barriers to trade, then they should disappear at the intra-
national level. Their presence in country level analysis cannot just be 
linked to barriers to trade, but may reflect other factors, such as the 
spatial distribution of production (Wolf, 2000), the presence of social 
and business networks (Head and Mayer, 2003) but also a pure ‘home 
bias’ in consumer or firm preferences. 
Our paper does not aim to address directly the issue of defining the 
elements that contribute to create a border. We look at border effects 
at the country level with the aim of evaluating whether market 
fragmentation in the CEECs area, particularly when referring to 
imports from  EU countries, is more relevant than existing evidence 
for trade within the EU 15. Such concern is mainly motivated by the 
fact that barriers in movements of goods between the EU and the 
CEECs have been started to be dismantled relatively recently mainly 
through mutual recognition agreements and the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire by the applicant countries. 
We investigate on border effects at the country level having in mind 
two important points:  
 
1. the possibility of inflated border effects due to mismeasurement 
in distances (Head and Mayer, 2000). Information at the 
regional level both for CEECs and EU countries has been used 
in order to construct a weighted measure of distance both for 
between-countries and internal distances. Both arithmetic and 
harmonic means have been tested in order to check for 
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differences in results when using a formula of aggregation more 
coherent with suggestions from previous gravity exercises. 
2. the need to isolate border effects from impediments to trade 
due to technical barriers. A comparison between internal and 
international movements of goods requires a proper control for 
protection measure which can still operate in a liberalised trade 
area. As in Brenton and Vancauteren (2000) we consider this 
issue in the context of the impact of regulatory policies on 
international trade flows. We look at the extent of border effects 
for sectors grouped according to the approach adopted by the 
EU to remove technical barriers to intra-EU trade. The gravity 
model is applied to data that identifies separately sectors subject 
to the different approaches to the removal of technical barriers 
in the EU. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: next section reviews findings on 
country level border effects. We then discuss the issue of distance 
measurement (section 3) and technical barriers to trade (section 4). 
Section 5 discusses the model and the several econometric issues 
raised by estimating gravity equations. We then discuss the data in 
section 6 and present results in section 7. Conclusions follow. 
2. Literature 
In order to measure the effects of technical barriers on bilateral trade 
flows in the Central and Eastern European countries we use gravity 
method to look at border effects. Since the study of McCallum (1995) 
there has been a growing research effort on the so-called border 
effects. McCallum (1995) found that trade flows between Canadian 
provinces were about 22 times as large as their trade with US states of 
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same size and distances. Several studies arrived at similar results 
looking at trade in North America, OECD and Europe2.  
Head and Mayer (2000) estimated the size of border effects in the 
European Union by using the gravity approach on sectoral data. 
Compared to McCallum’s results the paper finds lower border effects: 
on average Europeans purchased 14 times more from domestic 
producers than from foreign ones. After grouping industries according 
to the importance of non-tariff barriers the paper assesses whether 
these categories display any correlation with the size of the estimated 
border effect. The paper finds no correlation between non-tariff 
barriers and the border effect, and the authors conclude that the cause 
of the border effects lies in the bias of consumer preferences towards 
domestically produced goods.  
Okubo (2003) looked at border effects in the Japanese market and 
found lower border effects than what was found for Europe, US or 
Canada. For tradable goods the paper found trade within Japan was 
only 3.41 times higher than trade with other countries (in 1990), while 
in manufactured goods Japan’s domestic trade was 7.46 times more 
than its trade with other countries.  
Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) also apply a gravity model to 
European sectoral data in order to identify the variation of border 
effects between the different types of sectors. The paper grouped 
sectors by the approach the EU adopted to removing technical 
barriers (old approach, mutual recognition, new approach and sectors 
where technical barriers are not important). The paper finds that 
border effects are significant for all groups of sectors except for those 
subject to mutual recognition. Border effects are high also for sectors 
                                                          
2 See, among others, Anderson (2001), Anderson and van Wincoop (2001), Chen 
(2002), Evans (1999, 2001), Head and Mayer (2000), Helliwell (1995, 1997, 1998, 
2000), Helliwell and Verdier (2000), Hillberry (1999,2001), Hillberry and Hummels 
(2002), Nitsch (2000), Wei (1996), and Wolf (1997, 2000). 
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where technical barriers are not important which suggests that other 
factors than policy-induced barriers also play a role.  
Chen (2002) examines the border effects for a set of European 
countries at three different levels: pooled level, country level and 
industry-specific level. The paper finds important differences in 
border effects between industries. The estimates for border effects 
range from zero to 4000 at industry specific-level. The paper also 
seeks to find an explanation for the causes of border effects by taking 
into consideration transportability of products, ‘multilateral trade 
resistance3, information costs4, spatial clustering, technical and non-
tariff barriers to trade. The paper finds that technical barriers to trade, 
firm and product-specific information costs increase border effects, 
while on the other hand non-tariff barriers are not significant. 
Moreover, industries which are not tied to a specific location display 
larger border effects.  
Evidence on CEECs countries is still quite scarce. Only the work of 
Sousa and Disdier (2002) assess the effect of legal framework on the 
bilateral trade flows of Hungary, Romania and Slovenia with EU and 
CEFTA countries using the ‘border effects’ approach for the period 
1995-1998. To measure legal framework quality the paper uses the 
‘extensiveness and effectiveness of legal reform’ EBRD indicator. The 
paper finds that the quality of legal framework strongly influences the 
export decisions of the EU producers, while CEFTA producers are 
less affected by this quality. Furthermore the border effects of 
                                                          
3 Anderson and Wincoop (2001) argue that bilateral trade is not only influenced by 
bilateral trade barriers but also by the average trade barriers that both partners face 
with all their trading partners, which they call ‘multilateral trade resistance’. Chen 
(2002) instead of constructing the multilateral resistance terms included country 
fixed-effects . 
4 Information costs captured partly by average firm size calculated for each sector 
and by using three dummies for industries according to whether search costs are 
assumed to be lower or higher.  
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Slovenia, Hungary and Romania are more significant towards CEFTA 
countries than towards EU countries.  
 
As in Sousa and Disdier we also aim to assess the magnitude of border 
effects within Central and Eastern European countries. We use a 
similar grouping of sectors as Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) as we 
examine how intra-country trade flows compare to external trade 
flows, across different groups of sectors, and whether the magnitude 
of this border effect is different within different Central and Eastern 
European countries.  
3. The Issue of Distance Measurement 
An issue linked to understanding the nature of border effect is how to 
provide estimates robust to controls for other elements giving an 
economic meaning to borders between states. Exchanges between 
economic actors are normally found to cost more if they cross any 
kind of administrative borders. Accounting for the difference in the 
costs involved in moving products within a country or between 
countries is therefore a crucial point. 
 
The gravity approach to modelling exchanges between economic 
actors contains the idea that space involves costs, other things equal. 
Such costs are captured by geographical (distance) variables. Wei 
(1996) showed how the gravity equation could be used to estimate 
border effects when data on trade flows by sub-national units are not 
available. The idea is that internal trade can be represented by the 
value of production minus exports to other countries. The coefficient 
of a dummy taking the value of 1 for the observations related to 
internal trade can then be interpreted as the border effect. Such an 
approach will provide accurate results only if other aspects at the 
country level, linked to the existence of a border, are controlled for 
and measured in an accurate way. Since gravity relates negatively flows 
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with distance, border effects are crucially dependent on how distances 
are measured5. 
The estimation of such effects requires the measurement of the 
distance between a country and its trade partners and, importantly, the 
measurement of internal distances6. The accuracy of such measures 
has been shown to be crucial in finding border effects which are not 
illusory (Head and Mayer, 2002). If internal distances are 
overestimated with respect to international distances border effects 
will be inflated, since the ‘true’ smaller distance would account for the 
‘excess’ in within country exchanges. Measuring internal and 
international distances so as to minimise any source of bias therefore 
becomes a fundamental step.  
 
Point to point measures (great circle distance between country centres) 
have normally been used in the gravity literature for obtaining 
between-countries distances. The selection of which city to consider as 
the economic centre of a country is a potential source of bias if 
countries are not small, trade partners are not far from each other, and 
when the economic activity is not concentrated in the chosen city 
(Head and Mayer, 2001). Exchanges between European countries 
easily fall into one of the previous categories. Large countries tend to 
share borders and their economic centres tend to be more than one, 
and geographically dispersed rather then concentrated in the main or 
capital city. Data on GDP shares for NUTS1 European regions 
provide some clear evidence of the European geography of 
production and of its evolution in time. 
                                                          
5 Related to distance is the geographical dimension of production. Other country 
aspects include trade policy measures affecting the movements of goods across 
borders. 
6 For internal distance it is meant the distance a country from itself (Head and 
Mayer, 2001) 
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With respect to internal distances several methods have been used in 
the literature. Portions of the distance between a country to its 
neighbours, (Wei, 1996; Wolf, 1997, 2000) or distances between the 
two major cities of a country have been replaced by area based 
measures (Nitsch, 2000, Redding and Venables, 2000; Head and 
Mayer, 2000; Helliwell and Verdier, 2001) due to the risk of possible 
geographical inconsistencies (Nitsch, 2000). Weighted averages, which 
use actual data on the spatial distribution of production within a 
country, rather than geometric assumptions on the shape of the 
available space, are computationally heavier and more complex. They 
require, in fact, within country data on activity, area, longitude and 
latitude. The first conclusion from comparing the two methods 
affirms that area-based approximations may be good indicators of 
averages using detailed data at the sub-national level (Nitsch, 2000). 
More recently Head and Mayer (2001) pointed out the need for a 
constant elasticity of substitution aggregation of internal distances 
between districts, so that a measure of effective distance is obtained.7 
Defining i and j two states with respectively k and l districts, whose 
total income (GDP) is defined by the y variables, the formula that 
satisfies the definition of effective distance between countries i and j 
(dij) is: 
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7 Defining state the smallest unit for which trade data are available and districts the 
smallest unit for which geographic information is available, effective distance 
between two states is defined as the solution of an equation summing trade between 
all the districts as a function of district-to-district distances. See Head and Mayer 
(2001) page.13.  
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Such a formula is a generalisation of the standard formula used to 
calculate the average distance (as in Head and Mayer, 2000), which 
assumes θ = 1. Several gravity exercises have shown θ value to be 
around –1. Accepting such an assumption the harmonic mean will be 
defined. 
Along with the argument of using a measure for θ consistent with 
results from the gravity literature, there is a potential case for inflated 
border effects from using the arithmetic mean. Whenever different, 
the harmonic mean is less than the arithmetic mean. If the difference 
in the two measures is in absolute terms higher for internal distances, 
illusory border effects may be due simply to the use of an aggregation 
formula (the arithmetic mean) which overestimates more the internal 
distances than the international ones8. 
 
We have used information at the regional level so as to construct a 
weighted measure of distance both for between-countries and internal 
distances. In formula (1) we have used regional GDP shares as 
weights. The use of a weighted measure has the main advantage of an 
integrated methodology for calculating both international and intra-
national distances. 
Relying on Head and Mayer (2000 and 2001) we have extended the 
calculation of average and effective distances (international and 
internal) to 6 reporting CEECs countries (Cyprus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Repubblic, Hungary, Latvia and Poland). Both arithmetic and 
harmonic means have been calculated in order to check for 
differences in results from using an aggregation formula coherent with 
evidence on the distance variable from previous gravity exercises. 
 
Distances have been calculated by applying the great circle formula to 
latitude and longitude data of the main city of each region. The main 
                                                          
8 In other words, it is not the difference between the two aggregation schemes that 
matters. It’s the bias in the relative measure of distance (international versus internal) 
imposed by using one or the other which is crucial in raising illusory border effects.  
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city is the more populated city which most of the time coincides with 
the administrative capital of the region (data on population have been 
recovered from www.citiesandagglomerations.com ). Data on the 
weight of each region have been collected from REGIO database, 
which provides GDP data for NUTS regions in the EU, and since 
1992 in the accession countries as well. The weights used refer to 
1996, since the dynamics of the spatial distribution of economic 
activities does not significantly vary from year to year. The internal 
distances within each region have been calculated by using Head and 
Mayer (2000) area based formula (.67* π/area ) which assumes that 
production in sub-national regions is concentrated in a single point at 
the center of a disk and consumers are uniformly distributed across 
the disk. 
 
International distances have been calculated with respect to all 15 EU 
countries (Belgium and Luxemburg have been merged) and the other 
trade partners in the region (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Turkey). Regional detailed data on 
latitude and longitude and economic weight for partners’ regions have 
been used in order to construct a weighted measure. NUTS1 level of 
disaggregation has been considered9.  
 
International and internal distance calculations are presented in Table 
1. As shown in the last rows the arithmetic mean is always bigger than 
the harmonic one. There is a potential for having illusory border 
effects since for each country (except Cyprus) the difference is bigger 
for the internal measure (in bold character) than for the international 
                                                          
9 Finland and Sweden have been considered as a country concentrated in one region 
whose main cities are Helsinki and Stockholm. Data on GDP provide sufficient 
evidence main activities are concentrated in that region. NUTS2 regions have been 
used for Portugal and Ireland. 
Also Cyprus has been considered as one region which includes only the Greek part, 
since data on the Turkish part of the island have not been found.  
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distances. This means that border effects are likely to arise because the 
overestimation of internal distances will fail to explain the higher 
internal trade. What could look like a border effect risks being simply 
an unaccounted distance effect. Therefore results obtained with both 
means will be compared10. 
4. Technical Barriers to Trade and the EU Instruments to their 
Removal 
Differences in national technical regulations and standards can have 
important adverse effects on the bilateral trade flows, it increases 
costs, distorts production processes and discourages business co-
operation. On the other hand the full harmonisation of all product-
related technical regulations can result in cumbersomely slow and 
ineffective procedures. In the EU before the ‘80s harmonisation of all 
product categories was achieved by the so-called ‘old approach’. 
Harmonization was very technical requiring in-depth consultations. 
Moreover, the adoption of old approach directives required unanimity 
in the Council of Ministers. These long delays resulted in 
ineffectiveness since national regulations were produced at a much 
faster rate than the production of harmonised EU directives 
(Pelkmans (1987)). A number of old approach directives still remain in 
force covering a wide range of product groups such as 
pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs and motor vehicles. 
 
In order to minimise technical barriers to trade in the EU and to 
reduce the costly procedure of product by product, or component by 
component, harmonisation of technical regulations, the EU initiated a 
                                                          
10 Cyprus has been considered as one region, since the lack of geographical 
disaggregated data. Therefore Helliwell and Verdier (2001) area based formula 
(.52* area ) has been used for calculating its internal distance and does not vary 
between the arithmetic and the harmonic mean. The choice of this particular 
formula has been motivated by the particular shape of Cyprus. 
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‘new approach’ which combines both harmonisation of different 
regulations and mutual recognition. Harmonization under the New 
Approach is required when for similar products the different national 
regulations differ significantly and Mutual Recognition cannot be 
achieved. One of the key elements which allow harmonization under 
New Approach to be more effective than Old Approach is that the 
directives can be adopted by majority voting. Furthermore, only 
essential requirements are indicated for the producers or service 
providers thus giving greater flexibility.  
 
The principle of mutual recognition was applied in cases where the 
harmonisation of regulations and standards is not considered essential 
from either a health/safety or an industrial point of view. The 
principle of mutual recognition means that, in any sectors which have 
not been subject to harmonisation measures, or which are covered by 
minimal or optional harmonisation measures, every country is obliged 
to accept into its territory products which are legally produced and 
marketed in another country. In other words, a producer or service 
provider who has fulfilled the requirements of his country of origin 
can sell his products or provide his services in the partner country. 
However it often requires accreditation of testing and certification of 
bodies, and a mutual recognition arrangement between bodies, 
because countries often regulate risks in slightly different ways for the 
same product (Brenton, Sheehy, Vancauteren (2001)). 
 
As part of the pre-accession strategy a special type of mutual 
recognition agreement (Protocols to the Europe Agreement on 
Conformity assessment and Acceptance of industrial products 
(PECAs)) was recently concluded with several accession countries. 
According to these agreements mutual recognition operates on the 
basis of the acquis communautaire. PECAs treat all mandatory 
approval procedures in the sectors that they cover. They are made up 
of a framework establishing general principles and procedures for the 
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mutual recognition of results of conformity assessment and mutual 
acceptance of industrial products. However, our data covers the 
period 1992-1998 when these mutual recognition agreements were not 
yet implemented.  
 
The EU expects Candidate Countries to apply the transposition of 
harmonised European product legislation at the latest by the date of 
accession. The application of the complex EU legislation on goods 
requires reform of both product legislation and administrative 
traditions based on national preferences and controls. Thus it requires 
a transitional period for the accession countries to be able to transpose 
the legislation. Several countries had applied the acquis communautaire in 
the field by 1999, while some other countries are still working on the 
transposition of EU regulations.  
5. The Model and data 
We estimate specifications from the following gravity equation: 
 
∑++
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where: 
 
Xij is the value of imports by country i from country j; 
GDPi  is the level of income in country i; 
POPi  is the level of population in country i; 
Dij is the distance between the trading centres of the two countries.  
Rij is the remoteness of country i in relation to all trading partners with 
the exception of country j.  
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GDP and POP are meant to capture size and similarity effects11 which 
affect trade between two countries and signs of the coefficients are 
expected positive. The remoteness of importing country i in relation 
to trading partner j is given as the weighted average distance between 
country i and all trading partners other than j, where the weights are 
given by the GDP of the trading partners:  
 
GDPkDikRij /jk∑ ≠=
 
The more remote is country i from other partners rather than j the 
greater the amount of trade is expected with country j. 
 
DUMijk are a set of k dummy variables. Separate dummy variables are 
included to reflect the effects of adjacency between i and j, if i and j 
have common borders, if there is a free trade agreement between i and 
j, and to reflect the size of the border effect (j =  i).  
To capture the effects of different preferential trade agreements of the 
reporting countries, we included three dummies: a dummy for Europe 
Agreements, a dummy for CEFTA and a dummy for other bilateral 
trade agreements concluded between the reporting and partner 
country. In all cases, we choose the date of entering into force of the 
agreement instead of the signing date.  
 
A sensitive issue in estimating equation above rises from the high 
correlations of the two variables meant to capture size and similarity 
effects (POP and GDP) which in our case is particularly high (Table 2 
contains correlation coefficients and significance level) (Pop e Gdp are 
highly correlated both for partner countries (0.80) and reporting 
countries (0.85). The alternative measure of similarity, GDP per capita, 
can be used along with a size measure. Also GDP per capita shows 
some correlation with POP (reporting countries) and with GDP 
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11 As a measure of similarity we also consider GDP per capita. 
(partners). We have therefore estimated two specifications, one 
including only GDP, another using GDP per capita along with POP. 
What plays a crucial role for estimating non-biased gravity parameters 
are proper controls for the heterogeneity in trade flows across 
countries (which is not accounted for by GDP or population 
variables) and controls for business cycle effects Mátyás (1997, 1998a, 
1998b). Panel data analysis allows such controls to be implemented. 
Business cycle effects can be controlled as time fixed effects, i.e. 
treated as constants and estimated. 
With respect to countries’ heterogeneity, a different approach has to 
be followed due to the presence of a country effect variable, distance, 
whose inclusion is crucial in our case. Distance cannot be estimated if 
both fixed effects for reporting and partners countries are included (it 
is equivalent to a time invariant variable which cannot be estimated if 
controls for each individual are included). The alternative random 
effect specification has been proven to be inadequate whenever there 
is a specific interest in the openness of the economies under analysis 
(Mátyás, 1998b). 
 
Therefore we have followed the approach of estimating a standard 
panel gravity model which includes dummy controls for each period, 
and for each reporting country including a control for the possible 
influence in the standard errors from the left source of heterogeneity. 
We have calculated robust standard errors across groups (partner 
countries) which account for the correlation in the error term due to 
the fact that some observations share the same partner country. Such 
procedure has been accounted by Moulton (1986) and involves 
correcting the variance-covariance matrix in order to take into account 
the correlation in the error for those observations that share the same 
partner country. 
 
Another econometric issue arises since our dependent variable is 
censored around the zero value. Though only a few observations (less 
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than 4% of the observations) are characterised by zero values, since 
our sample refers to aggregations of sectors, a tobit specification is a 
good methodology to correct the OLS bias from censoring. On the 
other hand, tobit estimates are strongly sensitive to the non-normality 
distribution and heteroschedasticity structure of the residuals. In order 
to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest we also 
present results obtained with Powell’s (1984) Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations (CLAD) estimator applied to a specification which 
includes country effects. The consistency of CLAD rests on the 
minimization of absolute deviations from the median which, 
differently from the mean, is not affected by the censoring of the 
distribution of the dependent variable. 
 
Adjacency dummy in the gravity equations tends to be highly 
significant. This can be partly due to the fact that neighboring 
countries can be expected to have an additional stimulus to trade 
because of similarity of tastes, an awareness of common interests, 
some personal and business linkages specially when the border regions 
are highly populated or when in the past the border was somewhere 
else (for example in the case of some Central and Eastern European 
countries). Aitken (1973) also argues that neighboring countries are 
likely to experience significant additional amounts of international 
trade in mainly locally traded goods, especially where border regions 
are densely populated as in much of Europe. However Head and 
Mayer (2002) argue that the possible main explanation of the 
significance of the adjacency dummy is due to mismeasurements of 
the distance. We include such dummies and our results would confirm 
Head and Mayer (2002) argument. 
 
Our adjacency dummy and the dummies for different free trade 
agreements take the value of one only for inter-country trade. 
Therefore with the border effect dummy we can interpret the 
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additional tendency to trade within a country than with another 
country that is not adjacent and doesn’t have free trade agreement.  
6. The Data 
Our data set consists of trade flows for the period 1992-1998 between 
a sample of accession countries (Cyprus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia 
and Poland) and EU countries and other accession countries.12 Both 
trade and production data originate from the World Bank Trade and 
Production Database and the data is in International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 2. The World Bank database is 
constructed from the COMTRADE database for trade data and the 
production data was constructed from UINIDO and OECD sources. 
Trade data was originally in SITC rev. 2 classification and then it was 
transformed to ISIC rev.2 by the World Bank. Both production and 
trade data are in thousands of US dollars and covers 28 manufacturing 
sectors. Trade and production data was transformed into NACE 70 
classification, in order to group products into three broad groups of 
new approach and mutual recognition sectors, old approach sectors, 
and mixed sectors (where both old and new approach applies to the 
products13). To group products into these three different categories we 
use the data from the detailed study undertaken for the Commission’s 
review of the impact of the Single Market in the EU (CEC (1998)14). 
This study provides information, at the 3-digit level of the NACE 
                                                          
12 EU 15 Member States, with Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated as one country, 
while the number of accession countries varies by reporting countries and years 
depending on the data availability. 
13 Products under mixed approach could not have been separated into old and other 
approach, partly due to the conversion from ISIC to NACE70 and partly because 
for certain products both approaches apply. 
14 CEC (1998), ‘Technical Barriers to Trade’, Volume 1 of Subseries III Dismantling 
of Barriers Of the Single Market Review, Office for Official Publication, 
Luxembourg 
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classification (about 120 manufacturing industries), of the dominant 
approach used by the Commission to the removal of technical barriers 
in the EU.  
As in previous studies on border effects, internal trade is measured 
here by the difference between domestic production and the value of 
exports.  
Population and GDP data is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators database. Constant GDP values were used where the data 
are in thousands of US dollars.  
7. Econometric Results  
7.1 Least Dummy Variable Model Estimator 
Table 3 and 4 summarises the results of the OLS estimation including 
controls for reporting country fixed effects (country FE15). Controls 
for partners’ country effects have been taken into account by 
estimating a variance and covariance matrix for data not independent 
within groups, but independent across groups. In this way, standard 
errors do not risk to be underestimated (giving rise to inflated t-tests) 
as a result of the correlation between the observations within trade 
partners. All regressions are also based on the Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator of variance in place of the conventional MLE variance 
estimator in order to obtain consistent estimate for heteroskedasticity. 
For each of our three categories, old approach, other and mixed 
approach, the two types of remoteness and distance measures 
(arithmetic and harmonic weighted averages) are used. Since the 
correlation between GDP and population variables inflates the 
coefficient of distance, we have estimated a model including only 
GDP (Tables 3 and 4). In order to control for the bias from omitting 
a measure of similarity we also present a model including population 
                                                          
15 Time fixed effects have been included but never resulted significant. Therefore 
they have been excluded in the models presented.  
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as a measure of the size or economic space created by the trading 
economies and GDP per capita as a measure of similarity when 
considering also country level border effects (Table 5). 
While GDP of the partner country (LnGdp) is always significant, and 
takes the expected sign, the size variable of the reporting country is 
significant only for old approach sectors. The size of the coefficient 
indicates an elasticity below 1. Taking into account other geographical 
characteristics accession countries tend to import more from richer 
and more populated EU countries. The correspondent coefficient for 
the reporting country when significant is higher and negative in sign 
(table 3), indicating that in old approach sectors reporting countries 
which are richer or bigger tend to import less. 
Distance takes the expected sign for all the three different categories 
and it is significant in all cases. Remoteness becomes significant only 
when distance is measured with the arithmetic method. Imports 
elasticity to distance ranges between 1.4-1.6, these values are in line 
with previous results in the literature (Venables, 2001),  
The dummy which stands for the Europe Agreement is significant and 
positive for all product categories and its coefficient is the highest for 
old approach products. This result suggests that the Europe 
Agreements had the largest positive effect on trade in old approach 
products, which might be also the result of the foreign direct 
investment by EU firms in accession countries which was significant 
during this period in sectors where technical barriers to trade were 
important. 
 
The dummy which captures the border effect is significant and high 
for all three categories, being highest for old approach and smallest for 
other approach. Measuring distance with the harmonic method would 
imply 221 times more internal trade in old approach products while 25 
times more internal trade in other approach products than the 
country’s trade with its partners. These estimates are less than half of 
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those which we obtain using the arithmetic method. Using the 
arithmetic method we find that a country trades with itself 492 times 
more in old approach products, while 54 times more in other 
approach products. The border effect is the strongest in the case of 
old approach products, and the lowest in the other approach category, 
while mixed approach is between the two (which is in line what one 
would expect due to the fact that mixed approach contains products 
for which both old and other approach applies). 
 
These results imply rather high border effects, in all three groups the 
coefficient is higher than those measured by Brenton and Vancauteren 
(2001). Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) found that in old approach 
products in 1997 a country would trade with itself 38 times more than 
with other countries, while in mutual recognition products the authors 
did not find significant border effects.  
 
In order to better understand our results on home bias we run the 
same regression including country specific dummies for home trade 
after controlling for country fixed effects. The results are presented in 
Table 4. The base country is Cyprus, while coefficients for Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia dummies measure differential border effects 
at the country level. All of them take a rather high value indicating a 
significant differential effect of these countries with respect to Cyprus. 
In the complete model, distance is significantly affecting trade in all 
three categories with a coefficient ranging from –2.1 to -1.6. This 
coefficient is higher than the estimates found usually in the literature, 
but similar to the results of Sousa and Disdier (2002) who estimated 
the effects of legal framework as a trade barrier on certain Central and 
Eastern European countries. The coefficient of remoteness is instead 
almost never significant. In Table 5, when we include both a similarity 
measure (GDP per capita) and a size variable (POP) results on 
distance and border effects are unaffected by the different 
specification. 
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7.2 Controls for the censoring of the dependent variable 
In tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 we introduce a control for the censoring at zero 
in the dependent variables. When the data are censored, OLS will 
result in coefficient estimates that are biased toward zero. We first 
estimate a tobit model corrected for the heteroskedasticity of the 
residuals for all our specifications. We also present a Censored Least 
Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimator applied to a specification 
which includes country fixed effects but not country border effects of 
the model including both GDP per capita and POP (Table 9)16. 
 
Both methods allow controlling for the censoring at zero value of our 
dependent variable. Traditional statistical analysis prefers maximum 
likelihood methods or related procedures to deal with the issue of 
censoring. However the validity of tobit or similar procedure requires 
correct specification of the error distribution where departures from 
the standard assumptions, in particular normality, imposes a strong 
price in terms of consistency (Johnston di Nardo, 1997)17. 
Semiparametric procedures lessen the dependence on a particular 
distribution of the residuals and the requirement of no 
heteroskedasticity in their structure, due to the minimization of the 
sum of absolute residuals from the sample median.18 We have 
therefore applied the procedure presented in Chay and Powell (2001) 
for a control of our tobit results.  
                                                          
16 CLAD estimates of the simple model have been run and are not presented for 
space reason, but can be obtained upon request. The iterative linear programming 
algorithm, used to minimize least standard deviations, did not converge to a 
minimum when estimating the model with country border effects. 
17 We have also estimated a tobit model to both specifications (with and without 
home trade dummies). The results are very similar to those obtained using OLS 
estimation method and the CLAD procedure. 
18 As reported in Chay and Powell (2001) for censored panel data with fixed effects, 
maximum likelihood estimation methods will generally be inconsistent even when 
the parametric form of the conditional errors distribution is correctely specified. 
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 The results of the tobit estimations are similar to those found 
previously. Coefficients are all similar to those obtained with the OLS 
estimations because censoring represents only a limited problem since 
the proportion of zeros in our dataset is quite small. The home bias 
effect is again higher for old approach products, while lower for other 
approach. Mixed approach products are, as expected, between the two 
above categories. 
CLAD estimates in table 9 confirm conclusions from tobit and OLS 
analysis on two facts: 1. the presence of border effects; 2. their 
difference across types of products grouped according to the technical 
barriers in their movements across borders. The last table would 
provide consistent estimates of the coefficients whereas instead the 
non-normality structure of the errors would determine non consistent 
estimates of the tobit model. The border effect coefficient for the old 
approach group of sectors is similar to the OLS, confirming that our 
countries trade 220 times more internally than externally to their 
borders. CLAD estimates would instead report a quite smaller effect 
for new approach sectors, indicating an intra borders trade 12 times 
bigger than the correspondent with other countries when using the 
effective distance measure. Results on the distance variables are pretty 
similar, with a smaller effect of distance on the old approach group. 
7. Conclusions 
We have looked at the issue of border effects by investigating imports 
of 5 accession countries differing in size and other characteristics 
(Hungary, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Cyprus). Measuring national 
border effects contributes to evaluate whether market fragmentation 
between the EU and the accession area is more relevant than is 
suggested by estimates of border effects between the EU-15. Such a 
concern is mainly motivated by the fact that barriers in movements of 
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goods between the EU and the CEECs have been dismantled 
relatively recently. 
 
Following Brenton and Vancauteren (2000) we have considered the 
extent of border effects for sectors grouped according to whether 
technical regulations are important and then by the approach adopted 
by the EU to remove technical barriers to intra-EU trade. We group 
products in three categories; old approach, other approach (including 
mutual recognition, new approach), and mixed approach (which 
includes products where old approach and another approach is 
applicable). Our results suggest that the border effects are the largest 
for old approach products, where we expect to have the most 
important technical barrier to trade due to complicated harmonization 
procedures. The ‘other approach’ category has the smallest border 
effects, while the ‘mixed approach’ products are in between the two 
previous categories. Our countries of interest would trade with 
themselves 220 times more in old approach products, while only 25 
times more in other approach products the corresponding number 
ranges between 12 and 25 according to different estimators used. 
When considering country specific border effects Hungary had the 
highest border effects, followed by Bulgaria, Poland and Latvia.  
 
Our results suggest that the border effect is important for accession 
countries and these effects are more important than in the case of EU 
countries as shown by previous studies. The importance of home bias 
in trade with other accession countries relative to internal trade and 
towards EU partner countries varies according to the approach to the 
removal of technical barriers to trade. The results are comparable to 
the results of Brenton and Vancauteren (2001), who found that 
membership of a free trade agreement with the EU is important for 
New and Old Approach products but is insignificant for mutual 
recognition products. We also found similar trends, although we 
found that trade in New Approach and mutual recognition products 
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between the accession countries and the EU is also mitigated, 
although to a lesser extent than in Old Approach products.  
 
All accession countries included in our estimation trade with itself 
more than with other countries, and home bias is higher than in the 
case of EU countries. Home bias is highest for old approach products, 
accession countries in our sample tend to use more home produced 
products where technical regulations are more complex than products 
imported from abroad. These border effects in products with 
important technical barriers to trade are mitigated for EU partner 
countries, but not for other accession countries. This might be also 
the result of the foreign direct investment by EU firms in accession 
countries which was significant during this period in sectors where 
technical barriers to trade were important. Much of this investment 
probably led to production consistent with EU standards (Brenton 
and Vancauteren (2001)). On the other hand for new approach 
products and for products where mutual recognition principle applies 
being an EU partner country offsets the border effects to a smaller 
extent. 
 
The dummy which takes a value of one when a country has 
implemented the Europe Agreements and zero otherwise captures in 
our estimation mainly the effect of the free trade agreement between 
the EU and accession countries. The coefficient of this dummy 
implies that the implementation of the Europe Agreements had a 
positive effect on accession countries’ bilateral trade flows during the 
1992-1998. This effect varied between the different sectors. For trade 
in products where we expect to have higher barriers to trade, the free 
trade agreement between accession countries and the EU had higher 
positive effects on trade flows than in products where technical 
barriers play smaller role. It also implies that trade in products which 
are highly regulated the accession countries tend to trade more with 
the EU than with other accession countries.  
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We have also controlled for the possibility of inflated border effects 
due to mismeasurement in the distance variable by using a formula of 
aggregation in constructing the mean for the distance variable more 
coherent with suggestions from previous gravity exercises (Head and 
Mayer, 2002). Both arithmetic and harmonic means for the 
international and internal measures of distances have been found 
negative and significant for all type of products. The border effect 
coefficients for the harmonic mean have been found consistently 
smaller, regardless the relevance of technical barriers. Furthermore 
distance has also been found to be a slightly smaller impediment when 
using the effective measure. On the other hand distance has the 
strongest negative effect for imports of products regulated by the old 
approach. In other words imports which are more likely to be affected 
by technical barriers tend to have origin from nearer countries. 
 
The magnitude of the estimated border effects seems to be too large 
to be consistent only with the presence of trade barriers. In this paper 
we did not aim to explain fully what causes this high estimate for 
border effects, we rather tried to see whether we could observe some 
difference in the importance of border effects in trade in products 
with different magnitude of technical barriers. Thus what we could 
conclude from our results is that there are larger and more persistent 
border effects for sectors where technical regulations constitute major 
barriers to trade. However, border effects, although to a lesser extent, 
are also significant for products, where technical regulations are less 
cumbersome. Interestingly this result is different from findings of 
Brenton and Vancauteren (2001), the authors found higher levels of 
border effects for sectors where technical regulations did not 
constitute major barriers to trade. Furthermore, the presence of 
border effects in sectors where technical regulations are less important 
can also be explained by other factors, such as rules of origin, spatial 
distribution of production, the presence of social and business 
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networks, consumer or firm preferences and for our estimation also 
by tariffs. Although tariffs were gradually dismantled during the 
period, moreover we did not find significant reduction of border 
effects over time.  
 
Our results suggest that the estimated level of border effects is partly 
due to policy-related constraints, thus there is an important role for 
policy makers to remove these barriers. The level of trade of accession 
countries is substantially lower than what would arise in the absence of 
border effects, which is much more pronounced in trade with other 
accession countries than in the trade of accession countries with the 
EU. Certainly the border effects are present not only due to policy 
related constraint, but the larger border effects for products with 
higher technical barriers to trade suggests that an important part of the 
border effects in the case of the accession countries could be 
eliminated by removal of such barriers.  
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Table 1 International and internal weighted distances for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Cyprus. 
 Bel     
  
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
    
  
   
  
16 2 6 2 4 24 0 14 11 4 6
    2 8 6 4 63 4 5 79 9 6
    
    
    
    
Den 
 
Ger
 
Gre
 
Spai FR Irel Italy Lux Neth Au Port Finl Swe UK Bulg Cze Esto Hun Lit Latv Pol Rom Slove Slova Turk Cyp
Average 1  
Bulgaria 1812 1688 1482 529 2143 1848 1772 1126 1628 1830 956 2824 1946 1906 2235 179 1089 1852 682 1316 1505 1107 360 897 820 379 1118
Czech R. 796 660 486 1416 1635 1015 695 821 668 775 246 2218 1292 1064 1195 1089 149 1209 427 853 969 386 925 424 304 1426 2198
Hungary 1168 1037 837 1030 1767 1289 1102 799 1004 1170 318 2411 1484 1344 1582 682 427 1392 129 913 1081 526 543 366 203 1015 1781
Latvia 1504 805 1236 1984 2580 1855 1258 1746 1486 1398 1132 3127 451 545 1766 1505 969 358 1081 201 116 659 1223 1323 968 1696 2417
Poland 1048 623 737 1517 1975 1322 874 1128 964 987 520 2551 1011 855 1403 1107 386 923 526 534 659 255 877 704 399 1395 2168
Cyprus 2933 2784 2596 1000 3055 2918 2899 2107 2738 2957 2065 3733 2853 2913 3366 1118 2198 2764 1781 2237 2417 2168 1312 1989 1916 772 42.2
Harmonic 2  
Bulgaria 1807 1686 1455 453 2084 1820 1762 1073 1621 1825 943 2816 1944 1904 2221 116 1073 1850 666 1314 1500 1083 300 883 809 345 1111
Czech R. 780 651 417 1387 1578 966 663 774 650 757 225 2208 1290 1062 1170 1073 64.7 1207 390 847 966 323 881 419 225 1417 2193
Hungary 1162 1034 798 993 1705 1257 1088 765 997 1164 281 2404 1481 1342 1566 666 390 1389 80.6 908 1077 478 466 341 174 1010 1778
Latvia 1502 799 1210 1968 2548 1833 1255 1730 1484 1393 1130 3121 442 530 1758 1500 966 347 1077 187 54.8 631 1208 1322 963 1694 2414
Poland 1026 575 662 1480 1922 1280 841 1088 944 960 481 2539 993 830 1377 1083 323 904 478 495 631 167 828 679 333 1378 2157
Cyprus 2932 2784 2584 983 3023 2903 2896 2076 2738 2957 2063 3733 2853 2913 3358 1111 2193 2764 1778 2237 2414 2157 1296 1989 1913 772 42.2
Difference between Arithmetic and Harmonic Mean 3 
   
 
Bulgaria 6 2 26 76 60 28 10 53 7 6 13 8 2 1 14 63 1 6 3
Czech R. 16 9 69 29 57 50 32 47 18 18 21 10 2 2 25 16 85 3 4
Hungary 5 4 39 36 62 32 14 34 7 6 37 7 3 3 16 16 38 3 49 5 5 48 77 25 30 5 3
Latvia 2 6 26 16 33 22 3 16 1 5 3 6 8 15 7 4 4 11 5 15 62 28 15 1 5 3 3
Poland 21 49 75 37 53 42 34 40 20 27 38 12 18 24 26 24 63 19 48 39 28 88 49 25 67 17 11
Cyprus 0 0 12 17 33 15 4 31 0 0 2 1 0 0 7 6 6 0 3 0 3 11 17 0 3 0 0
1: Weighted arithmetic mean across the regions of country i of the weighted mean distance for each region in country i with regions of country j (GDP regional shares are used as 
weights) 
2: Weighted harmonic mean across the regions of country i of the weighted harmonic mean distance for each region in country i with regions of country j (GDP regional shares 
are used as weights) 
3: 1-2 
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Table 2. Correlation table of relevant regressors 
 
    lngdp lnpop lngdpr lnpopr lndistharmonic lremharmonic lngdppop
lngdp      1   
lnpop 0.7948 1      
        
        
        
       
        
     
       
     
       
      
       
       
       
0
lngdpr 0.0418 0.0338 1
0.26 0.37
lnpopr 0.0173 0.0158 0.8534 1
0.64 0.67 0
lndistharmonic 
 
0.2777 0.1137 -0.273 -0.3509 1
0 0.00 0 0
lremharmonic 
 
0.1116 0.0887 -0.5008 -0.7369 0.3121 1
0.00 0.02 0 0 0
lngdppop 0.7167 0.1465 0.0292 0.0101
 
0.322 0.0799 1
0 0.00 0.43 0.79 0 0.03
lngdpopr 0.0318 0.0223 -0.0776 -0.5859
 
0.2467 0.6308 0.0262 
0.40 0.55 0.038 0 0 0 0.48
p-values in italic 
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Table 3. OLS coefficients, with country fixed effects, without country specific border effects 
 Old approach
with arithmetic 
distance  
 Old approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Other approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Other approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Mixed approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Mixed approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
LnGdpPartner 0.757      0.809 0.889 0.930 0.930 1.020
 (0.159)*** (0.128)*** (0.109)***    (0.091)*** (0.123)*** (0.091)***
LnGdpReporti
ng 
-1.727      -2.106 0.028 -0.262 1.268 0.521
(0.842)* (0.686)*** (0.892) (0.746) (0.683)* (0.787)
adjacency       0.525 0.372 -0.358 -0.523 0.014 -0.104
 (0.696)      (0.744) (0.579) (0.578) (0.584) (0.582)
EuropeAgree
ment 
1.385      1.350 1.087 1.063 0.952 0.888
(0.306)*** (0.279)*** (0.398)** (0.393)** (0.420)** (0.401)**
CEFTA       -0.773 -0.863 0.712 0.600 0.690 0.657
(0.861) (0.878) (0.542) (0.537) (0.573) (0.597)
BorderEffect 6.224      5.476 4.053 3.261 5.286 4.626
 (1.677)*** (1.867)*** (1.136)***    (1.137)*** (1.114)*** (1.176)***
LnRemoteness 1.899      0.682 1.021 0.064 3.631 1.324
 (2.394)      (1.124) (1.787) (0.968) (1.533)** (1.069)
LnDistance -1.388      -1.524 -1.530 -1.656 -1.283 -1.433
 (0.660)** (0.629)** (0.285)***    (0.244)*** (0.397)*** (0.354)***
Constant       16.942 32.284 -4.530 7.546 -47.290 -18.438
 (29.856)     (16.629)* (24.058) (15.713) (20.312)** (19.163)
Observations 718      718 718 718 718 718
R-squared 0.69      0.69 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74
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Table 4. OLS coefficients, with country fixed effects, with country specific border effects 
 
Old approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Old approach with 
harmonic distance 
Other approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Other approach with 
harmonic distance 
Mixed approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Mixed approach with 
harmonic distance 
LnGdpPartner 0.761 0.810 0.886 0.925 0.938 1.026 
 (0.165)***      (0.127)*** (0.110)*** (0.092)*** (0.127)*** (0.091)***
LnGdpReporting -1.935 -2.276 -0.134 -0.401 1.125 0.409 
 (0.819)**      (0.689)*** (0.899) (0.769) (0.582)* (0.749)
adjacency       0.046 0.037 -0.736 -0.788 -0.318 -0.321
(0.745) (0.792) (0.544) (0.573) (0.547) (0.574)
EuropeAgreement 1.529      1.452 1.213 1.156 1.043 0.947
 (0.325)***      (0.292)*** (0.411)*** (0.401)*** (0.420)** (0.400)**
CEFTA       -0.947 -0.973 0.583 0.521 0.571 0.589
(0.851) (0.870) (0.539) (0.533) (0.585) (0.606)
BorderEffect       0.535 0.856 -0.313 -0.137 1.247 1.478
 (2.866)      (2.800) (1.252) (1.223) (1.606) (1.598)
LnRemoteness 1.767      0.548 0.965 -0.014 3.524 1.221
 (2.302)      (1.033) (1.656) (0.931) (1.456)** (1.036)
LnDistance -1.918      -1.870 -1.945 -1.927 -1.645 -1.653
 (0.749)**      (0.712)** (0.303)*** (0.310)*** (0.424)*** (0.407)***
dumHungaryhome 8.834      7.835 6.990 6.034 6.785 5.920
 (1.601)***      (1.286)*** (0.699)*** (0.610)*** (0.746)*** (0.622)***
dumBulgariahome 5.163      4.291 3.891 3.056 3.857 3.165
 (1.624)***      (1.286)*** (0.702)*** (0.579)*** (0.984)*** (0.795)***
dumPolandhome 4.108      3.222 3.316 2.485 2.387 1.644
 (1.797)**      (1.485)** (0.813)*** (0.701)*** (1.049)** (0.899)*
dumLatviahome 4.067      2.634 2.172 0.750 2.925 1.731
 (1.439)***      (0.906)*** (0.609)*** (0.480) (0.966)*** (0.724)**
Constant       25.375 38.777 1.801 12.611 -41.455 -14.189
(27.945) (15.520)** (22.661) (15.892) (16.576)** (17.321)
Observations 718      718 718 718 718 718
R-squared       0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76
       
       
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. OLS coefficients, with country fixed effects, with country specific border effects 
 Old approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Old approach with 
harmonic distance 
Other approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Other approach with 
harmonic distance 
Mixed approach with 
arithmetic distance  
Mixed approach with 
harmonic distance 
LnGdpPerCapitaPartner 1.074 1.118 1.051 1.089 1.211 1.291 
 (0.220)***      (0.206)*** (0.191)*** (0.194)*** (0.218)*** (0.208)***
LnGdpPerCapitaReporting -2.269      -2.656 0.620 0.322 1.825 1.003
 (0.934)** (0.905)*** (1.188)    (1.102) (0.654)*** (0.910)
LnPopulationReporting 3.351      2.848 -6.764 -7.179 -4.308 -4.642
 (4.657)      (4.639) (4.102) (4.151)* (3.823) (3.863)
LnPopulationPartner       0.611 0.670 0.818 0.864 0.819 0.918
 (0.180)***      (0.142)*** (0.155)*** (0.140)*** (0.165)*** (0.138)***
adjacency       -0.018 -0.031 -0.749 -0.803 -0.352 -0.359
 (0.718)      (0.764) (0.547) (0.578) (0.526) (0.548)
EuropeAgreement       1.289 1.217 1.001 0.945 0.742 0.659
 (0.275)***      (0.250)*** (0.308)*** (0.302)*** (0.314)** (0.297)**
CEFTA       -0.862 -0.896 0.574 0.511 0.589 0.604
(0.856) (0.875) (0.553) (0.548) (0.602) (0.628)
BorderEffect -0.823      -0.442 -0.931 -0.731 0.165 0.455
 (2.868)      (2.812) (1.522) (1.540) (2.031) (2.005)
LnRemoteness       1.697 0.318 1.039 -0.056 3.580 1.103
 (2.263)      (1.102) (1.695) (1.037) (1.510)** (1.222)
LnDistance -2.104      -2.051 -2.011 -1.994 -1.774 -1.779
 (0.731)***      (0.705)*** (0.361)*** (0.376)*** (0.481)*** (0.470)***
dumHungaryhome 9.952      8.828 7.501 6.496 7.680 6.711
 (1.588)***      (1.286)*** (1.013)*** (0.911)*** (1.048)*** (0.857)***
dumBulgariahome 6.644      5.649 4.613 3.732 5.090 4.291
 (1.679)***      (1.384)*** (0.996)*** (0.904)*** (1.445)*** (1.244)***
dumPolandhome 5.661      4.642 4.024 3.141 3.627 2.769
 (1.843)***      (1.539)*** (1.201)*** (1.096)*** (1.584)** (1.383)*
dumLatviahome 5.171      3.575 2.713 1.231 3.848 2.523
 (1.414)***      (0.925)*** (0.831)*** (0.684)* (1.182)*** (0.875)***
Constant       -41.349 -24.635 90.278 103.931 32.241 55.726
 (70.483)      (64.765) (55.694) (54.633)* (57.694) (54.783)
Observations       718 718 718 718 718 718
R-squared       0.72 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Tobit with country fixed effects, without country specific border effects 
 
 Old approach
with arithmetic 
distance  
 Old approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Other approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Other 
approach with 
harmonic 
distance 
Mixed approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Mixed 
approach with 
harmonic 
distance 
LnGdpPartner 0.775      0.836 0.890 0.932 0.936 1.026
 (0.167)*** (0.134)*** (0.108)*** (0.091)***   (0.124)*** (0.092)***
LnGdpReporting -1.758      -2.214 0.024 -0.270 1.271 0.525
 (0.919)* (0.739)*** (0.883)    (0.741) (0.686)* (0.789)
adjacency       0.491 0.336 -0.362 -0.527 0.022 -0.096
(0.762) (0.819) (0.576) (0.575) (0.582) (0.580)
EuropeAgreement      1.453 1.410 1.094 1.069 0.954 0.891
 (0.325)*** (0.298)*** (0.401)*** (0.396)***   (0.423)** (0.405)**
CEFTA       -0.983 -1.062 0.726 0.614 0.715 0.682
(0.990) (1.003) (0.545) (0.540) (0.573) (0.596)
BorderEffect 6.209      5.435 4.055 3.261 5.315 4.655
 (1.782)*** (2.001)*** (1.135)*** (1.136)***   (1.113)*** (1.173)***
LnRemoteness 2.288      0.823 1.051 0.081 3.636 1.333
 (2.643)      (1.234) (1.794) (0.972) (1.545)** (1.058)
LnDistance -1.446      -1.591 -1.534 -1.660 -1.281 -1.432
 (0.713)** (0.687)** (0.282)*** (0.242)***   (0.392)*** (0.350)***
    
Observations       718 718 718 718 718 718
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Table 7. Tobit with country fixed effects, with country specific border effects 
 
Old approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Old approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Other approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Other approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Mixed approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Mixed approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
LnGdpPartner       0.779 0.836 0.887 0.927 0.943 1.031
 (0.172)*** (0.132)*** (0.109)***    (0.091)*** (0.127)*** (0.092)***
LnGdpReporting -1.978      -2.390 -0.138 -0.409 1.128 0.413
 (0.895)**     (0.742)*** (0.889) (0.762) (0.584)* (0.747)
adjacency       -0.013 -0.015 -0.741 -0.793 -0.309 -0.312
 (0.833)      (0.882) (0.541) (0.570) (0.544) (0.571)
EuropeAgreement 1.601      1.514 1.220 1.162 1.045 0.949
 (0.349)*** (0.314)*** (0.412)***    (0.403)*** (0.422)** (0.402)**
CEFTA       -1.149 -1.165 0.596 0.535 0.596 0.614
 (0.967)      (0.984) (0.540) (0.533) (0.583) (0.603)
BorderEffect       0.323 0.673 -0.330 -0.151 1.287 1.516
 (3.131)      (3.060) (1.250) (1.221) (1.586) (1.579)
LnRemoteness       2.126 0.671 0.994 0.001 3.529 1.230
 (2.532)      (1.131) (1.655) (0.931) (1.464)** (1.023)
LnDistance -1.997      -1.949 -1.950 -1.933 -1.642 -1.650
 (0.825)**     (0.787)** (0.302)*** (0.310)*** (0.418)*** (0.402)***
dumHungaryhome 9.206      8.158 7.023 6.063 6.800 5.937
 (1.798)*** (1.450)*** (0.703)***    (0.615)*** (0.742)*** (0.624)***
dumBulgariahome 5.282      4.374 3.903 3.065 3.838 3.148
 (1.771)*** (1.398)*** (0.698)***    (0.575)*** (0.971)*** (0.785)***
dumPolandhome 4.192      3.262 3.330 2.496 2.358 1.617
 (1.952)**     (1.607)** (0.812)*** (0.701)*** (1.034)** (0.887)*
dumLatviahome 4.206      2.713 2.181 0.754 2.918 1.726
 (1.567)*** (0.975)*** (0.603)***    (0.474) (0.956)*** (0.719)**
   
Observations       718 718 718 718 718 718
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8. Tobit with country fixed effects, with country specific border effects 
 Old approach
with arithmetic 
distance  
 Old approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Other approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Other approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
Mixed approach 
with arithmetic 
distance  
Mixed approach 
with harmonic 
distance 
LnGdpPerCapitaPartner 1.136      1.188 1.055 1.094 1.224 1.305
 (0.230)***      (0.215)*** (0.192)*** (0.195)*** (0.218)*** (0.209)***
LnGdpPerCapitaReporting -2.345      -2.807 0.624 0.322 1.824 1.002
 (1.022)**      (0.988)*** (1.174) (1.092) (0.653)*** (0.908)
LnPopulationReporting       3.739 3.193 -6.826 -7.245 -4.233 -4.572
 (5.130)      (5.100) (4.095)* (4.141)* (3.943) (3.978)
LnPopulationPartner       0.612 0.679 0.818 0.864 0.821 0.921
 (0.187)***      (0.147)*** (0.155)*** (0.139)*** (0.165)*** (0.138)***
adjacency       -0.090 -0.098 -0.755 -0.809 -0.344 -0.351
 (0.807)      (0.855) (0.543) (0.574) (0.522) (0.544)
EuropeAgreement       1.327 1.247 1.004 0.948 0.738 0.655
 (0.294)***      (0.267)*** (0.308)*** (0.301)*** (0.316)** (0.299)**
CEFTA       -1.048 -1.075 0.588 0.525 0.616 0.631
 (0.968)      (0.985) (0.554) (0.548) (0.599) (0.624)
BorderEffect -1.212      -0.798 -0.962 -0.759 0.175 0.463
 (3.158)      (3.090) (1.518) (1.535) (2.002) (1.978)
LnRemoteness       2.014 0.393 1.066 -0.044 3.584 1.105
 (2.484)      (1.212) (1.694) (1.037) (1.515)** (1.209)
LnDistance -2.208      -2.153 -2.018 -2.001 -1.774 -1.780
 (0.809)***      (0.780)*** (0.360)*** (0.376)*** (0.474)*** (0.464)***
dumHungaryhome 10.481      9.294 7.546 6.537 7.719 6.753
 (1.819)***      (1.480)*** (1.025)*** (0.924)*** (1.043)*** (0.859)***
dumBulgariahome 6.960      5.916 4.641 3.756 5.104 4.306
 (1.850)***      (1.517)*** (0.994)*** (0.903)*** (1.424)*** (1.227)***
dumPolandhome 5.948      4.870 4.054 3.167 3.632 2.776
 (2.027)***      (1.684)*** (1.200)*** (1.095)*** (1.560)** (1.364)**
dumLatviahome 5.456      3.780 2.735 1.246 3.866 2.542
 (1.555)***      (1.002)*** (0.826)*** (0.680)* (1.165)*** (0.863)***
       
Observations       718 718 718 718 718 718
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9. Censored least absolute deviation estimates with country fixed effects, without country specific border 
effects 
Lnoldapproach Lnoldapproach Lnother Lnother Lnmixed Lnmixed
LnGdpPartner       0.765 0.791 0.906 0.891 0.93 0.989
       0.058***      0.059***       0.044***       0.037***        
0.034*** 
      0.041*** 
LnGdpReporting       -1.69 -1.829 0.397 1.019 1.357 0.879
 0.849** 0.760** 0.722 0.576** 0.593** 0.545 
adjacency     0.563 0.532 0.085 -0.015 0.35 0.185
 0.313      0.273 0.145 0.146 0.184 0.196
EuropeAgreement       1.226 1.14 0.778 0.759 0.84 0.757
      0.514**      0.477**     0.127**    0.016**      0.048** 0.708 
CEFTA       0.148 -0.044 0.172 0.022 0.636 0.709
 0.570      0.571 0.221 0.236 0.259 0.296
BorderEffect 6.173      5.505 3.211 2.513 4.148 3.302
       0.710***       0.742***    0.342***    0.483***    0.507***    0.596*** 
LnRemoteness       0.947 0.192 -1.737 -0.576 2.256 0.251
 1.598      0.514 1.273 0.521 0.701*** 0.780
LnDistance -1.241      -1.274 -1.779 -1.753 -1.515 -1.615
 0.340      0.297 0.208 0.212 0.190 0.215
Constant       22 30 13 -5.902 -36 -13
 19.641      12.149 19.454 11.791 13.019 12.497
Observations       718 718 718 718 718 718
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
